Tzipi Livni: I still can
By Ari Shavit

Haaretz Magazine - 30 January 2009

There is one thing you can't take away from Tzipi Livni: she has a worldview. Taking the stage at 11 P.M. at the Kultura Club in south Tel Aviv to fire up the Kadima party's young generation, she speaks with passion about one subject: the partition of the country. The existential need to establish two nation-states here. The existential need for Israel not to take in refugees, for the Palestinian state to be demilitarized and for both sides to agree to end the conflict. The need to fight Hamas while at the same time holding negotiations with the Palestinian moderates. The need to arrive at a political settlement that will give Israel a border and ensure its identity as the national expression of the Jewish people.

That is the plan. That is Livni's passion. For a year and a half she held detailed, verbose and systematic talks with Ahmed Qureia with the intention of transforming the vision into a new political reality. In the course of the negotiations Livni agreed that the basis for the partition will be the 1967 boundary with minor adjustments and territorial exchanges. She also agreed that more than 70,000 settlers will be evacuated from dozens of settlements. However, she did not discuss Jerusalem. She did not find a solution for the refugee problem. Nor was she able to crack the dilemma of demilitarization. Consequently, she is not going to the public in this election campaign with a draft agreement in hand. Maybe in another year. Maybe in the next elections.

Just four months ago, Livni was almost prime minister. She was a step away from power. However, Shas' back-turning and the war on Hamas left her very far from the prime minister's residence. Friendly polls say she is slightly behind Likud leader Benjamin Netanyahu; less friendly polls show a wide gap. The public is drowsy; Kadima is paralyzed. However, the foreign minister seems not to have heard the bad news. She is fighting like a lion, fighting with momentum, fighting with a smile on her lips and with spirits high.

The Livni story is unique in the annals of Israeli politics. Never before has a woman risen so rapidly to such a high position almost without resistance. Never before has a politician enjoyed such broad popularity without having experience, unusual achievements or charisma. Livni was lucky: she stuck with Ariel Sharon and with him carved her way to the top. When Sharon collapsed, she was the anti-Olmert and afterward the anti-Netanyahu. In quite a few senses she meets the longing for change, for a different politics. Still, one of the explanations for her success may actually be the fact that she is "one of ours." Not a distinguished policymaker but a woman at eye level. Not an overweening general but a woman of judgment. A businesslike, opinionated lawyer from Tel Aviv who cracked the code of the Israeli center and learned how to represent it.

The well-known flaw in the foreign minister's character is her short temper. Livni is a quick study, but is not always pleasant. However, when she gets to her home in the fashionable Ramat Hahayal area of Tel Aviv late at night she is surprising both in her alertness and in her cordiality. She exchanges a few words with her son, Omer, who is about to begin army service. She asks her husband, Naftali, about the son who is now in basic training (Paratroops). She offers an espresso, drinks a cafe au lait. And takes a seat by the table in the dining area to explain that she can do it. Yes, she can. There is no doubt that she can.

Why vote Livni and not Ehud Barak or Benjamin Netanyahu?

"Because I know what is right for this country. I have a vision and I know how to realize it. I know that I can do it and I know how to do it."

What is the vision?

"The vision is Israel's existence as a state that is a national home for the Jewish people. A democratic state in the Land of Israel and a secure state.

Apart from the vision, what do you have that the other two candidates do not have?

"I look first of all at the state. I know what is right for the state, I am driven by a mission and I know how to translate the mission into practice. I have very clear insights and a very clear backbone. I am the only one who represents a process that represents all the values, principles and interests that are right for the State of Israel."

Can you illustrate?

"Bibi [Netanyahu] thinks we have to choose between security and peace. I think that is a terrible mistake that will lead to a situation in which there is no security, either. There will be no hope and there will be no security. I believe in standing very clearly on those two legs: both security and peace, both Jewish and a democracy. Therefore only a government under me can be a true unity government in which the unity is also content and to which both Barak and Bibi can be partners."

Bibi was a controversial prime minister and a highly regarded finance minister. Barak was a controversial prime minister and a highly regarded defense minister. In contrast to them, you do not have a rich life story of failures and accomplishments.

"Netanyahu and Barak completed their terms of office as excoriated prime ministers. They were not controversial; they were bad prime ministers. There was deep revulsion toward both of them. Both of them failed, and I see that not as an advantage but as a defect. I believe that what decides whether you are a good prime minister is not experience but character. What you are as a person. Experience can be acquired, but character cannot be changed. Netanyahu and Barak each have a character problem that was revealed during their tenures as prime minister."

But you are a tabula rasa. You have been in politics for 10 years without having chalked up genuine achievements.

"That statement infuriates me. There is no comparison between me and Bibi at the time he was elected prime minister. What had he done by then? Been ambassador to the United Nations? Been the deputy foreign minister?

"I was the director general of the Government Corporations Authority and was a very big success there, both in making decisions and in being creative. Since 2001 I have held six different ministerial portfolios. During that period I was justice minister, construction minister and absorption minister."

As justice minister you did not leave any real imprint.

"Let's talk about that. My year in the Justice Ministry was the year of the disengagement [from Gaza]. I led the disengagement legislation and the processes regarding the settlers. Amid that I waged a struggle with the Supreme Court, which was an unconventional move at the time. I also spearheaded changes in the judiciary. It's true that I did not create headlines about reforms. I do not believe in a minister being appointed and immediately declaring a reform that in the end is not carried out, but only gives him the name of a reformer."

As foreign minister you led fruitless talks with the Palestinians.

"No more, please. Both the process and the point of completion or non-completion were my decision. A correct decision. I laid down the rules in advance. I am the one who said: We will discuss all the issues. I am the one who said: Do not trap us in a framework of time. I am the one who did not want to produce partial results and who opposed interim agreements and agreements in principle. I thought they were not good for Israel. If I do not know that I have a product that represents Israel's interests there will be no agreement. In my view, a bad agreement is worse than no agreement. As long as the dialogue continues; freezing the dialogue is the death of the process. I am conducting the process in the agreement that until everything is settled, nothing is settled. That is an itemized account of what I want."

As acting prime minister and foreign minister in the Second Lebanon War, your intuitions were right but you did not pound on the table. You did not fight hard enough for your views and you did not block Olmert, [former defense minister Amir] Peretz and [former chief of staff Dan] Halutz.

"In the Lebanon War, time passed between the point at which I knew, understood and said what the right thing to do was, and the point at which it happened. The conventional thinking was that it was a purely military matter. I created the idea of a diplomatic exit, and it took time before everyone accepted the idea."

As acting prime minister and foreign minister in Operation Cast Lead, you did not ensure a diplomatic exit in advance.

"My conception with regard to the Gaza operation was that its goal was to restore deterrence to its former level. Not to reach an arrangement, but to change the deterrence equation. I was apprehensive of a situation in which Israel would emerge with a military achievement and Hamas would emerge with a political achievement. Accordingly, I thought Cast Lead should be treated as a military operation with political goals. Which is how it turned out. After all the discussions, my opinion was the one that was accepted."

The campaign against Hamas cost you the support of the left. Suddenly you are so hawkish, so militant, supporting an all-out war in Gaza.

"It is precisely the left that should support my line. Anyone who believes in a political process between Israel and the Palestinians has to understand that the struggle between Fatah and Hamas is a zero-sum game. Either Abu Mazen [Mahmoud Abbas] or [Ismail] Haniyeh. If I conduct negotiations with Hamas or ease things at the crossings, I will do strategic damage to peace. To batter terrorism is not to batter peace but to support peace."

But the terrible killing, the destruction, the humanitarian disaster - you did not utter a word of compassion and you did not take moral responsibility for what we did.

"The loss of a child is a terrible price and terrible grief which is almost incomprehensible in the mind of every mother or father, Israeli or Palestinian. But there is a difference between compassion and humane grief and relating politically to an event. In law a distinction is made between a murderer and someone who kills accidentally. The terrorists are murderers. They are out to kill children. In contrast, we are out to kill terrorists. There is an absolute differentiation here between the two sides - morally, legally and politically. Accordingly, I have no regrets. I also rely on the moral values of the IDF soldiers."

Let us return to you. Do you really think you have gained enough experience to be prime minister? Isn't it too soon, too daring?

"In the past seven years I was at every junction at which there was a significant decision about Israel's well-being, security and character. After 2001 I led the change in Israeli and international thinking about the refugees. In 2004 I enabled the disengagement thanks to the Livni compromise [between senior Likud figures and Sharon]. In 2005 I led and advanced the idea to settle the Gush Katif [Gaza settlement bloc] evacuees in community-oriented villages. I made a substantial contribution to the creation of Kadima. I was the only politician there, in a room on the ranch [Sharon's Sycamore Ranch] when the decision was made.

"As foreign minister I led the double strategy with regard to the Palestinians: no to legitimacy for Hamas, yes to advancing the Annapolis process. In the [Second] Lebanon War I formulated [Security Council] Resolution 1701. In the present operation I stood behind the decisions that were made: launching the operation, the ground move, refusing a humanitarian cease-fire, refusing agreements with Hamas, avoidance of becoming mired. I am the one who said from the beginning what would happen at the end: no to a settlement with Hamas, no to a tahadiyeh [lull], to go on fighting, to restore deterrence, not to enter into agreements, to create a coalition. So in the end, if we are talking about experience, I went through two wars, one intifada, one peace process and the disengagement. I was also partner to important security decisions that could have led to a great achievement or, alternatively, to a general war.

"Therefore, the closer I got to the decision-making center, the more it became clear to me that I could do it well. That goes for judgment, for long-term thinking and for the backbone to make the decision, stand behind it and go all the way. I can be a better prime minister than any other candidate."

It's not too big for you?

"It's not too big for me and not too small for me. It's my size."

Let's say the polls are wrong, and you win. On March 1, 2009, you become prime minister of Israel. On March 2, a tycoon goes down, a big bank trembles and the economy is paralyzed. What do you do?

"Israel will not allow a bank to collapse. Period. Israel entered the economic crisis in a different situation from other countries in terms of the banks' stability. Some of the failures with which Obama has to contend in the United States do not exist here. But we are going to pay a price because we are part of the global village and because we adopted the free, competitive market.

"Netanyahu is an ideologue of a free economy without restraints or inhibitions. That is what is now collapsing with a loud noise around the world. That ideology does not see the weak population strata and does not offer them a solution, but believes that the money will trickle down. That is an extreme outlook which lacks compassion. I believe in a free market and in competition and privatization, on condition that the state remains responsible for the weak. I would cut the allowances of those who can work but not the allowances of the elderly and the disabled."

We are in a recession. Barak is proposing a deficit of NIS 3 billion, Netanyahu is proposing an income tax cut to 35 percent for individuals and to 18 percent for companies. What are you proposing?

"There is no doubt that we will have to pour in more money. If we do it right, we will be able to turn the crisis into an opportunity. To cope, we will have to breach the budget framework, but to the right purpose. Infrastructure investment is critical. That creates jobs. But it will also be necessary to break the bureaucracy. And we will also have to invest in education infrastructure: building classrooms, reducing the size of classes, better teachers. Turn unemployed high-tech people into teachers. We will have to upgrade the public sector and make workers mobile."

How big a deficit are you talking about?

"I do not want to get into numbers. More than 2 percent but less than the 7 percent Barak mentioned."

On March 10 Obama calls. He wants a peace agreement by 2010. Do you accede?

"Anyone who sees a peace agreement as something that is forced on Israel has a problem. Woe is us, what will we do with these demands? But I think the peace process represents Israeli interests. So I view the new American administration as an opportunity. The whole world knows that I approach the peace process in good faith. Without winking and without a hidden agenda. It took me three years to persuade the world that I, who came from the Likud, believe in peace. I am in a place where the world trusts me. That gives me credit to make war on terrorism and credit regarding Iran and credit to conduct the diplomatic process properly. Netanyahu doesn't have that credit. He is starting in the red. He is in a wild credit crisis."

Would you partition Jerusalem for the sake of peace?

"My idea calls for two nation-states living in peace and security. An agreement has three parameters. Security - secure borders, demilitarization, arrangements; settlement blocs - a maximum number of Israelis will remain in their homes; and preservation of places of national and historic importance to the Jewish people - first and foremost, Jerusalem.

Would you divide Jerusalem or not?

"Israel's position in negotiations is a unified Jerusalem, with the emphasis on the holy places. In the negotiations the discussions will continue with a thrust toward an agreement."

Would you or would you not evacuate the 70,000 or 80,000 settlers who live outside the big settlement blocs?

"The settlement I would bring will contain an act of partition. I believe that the majority of the population of Israel understands its significance."

Are you capable of uprooting 70,000 people from their homes?

"I won't get into numbers. But I know that if we do not do it, we will determine the fate of all the other millions to live in a state that is not their national home, which is not a Jewish-democratic nation-state."

Would you leave the Golan Heights in return for a full peace agreement with Syria?

"Peace with Syria can change the extremist-moderate balance in the region. There is a strategic goal here, which transcends the ceremony of opening an embassy and eating hummus in Damascus. It is clear to me that peace with Syria means territorial concession. I believe in direct negotiations. But in my view the Syrians received international legitimization somewhat prematurely, before they contributed anything. The test is the Syrians' readiness to disengage completely from the axis of evil and terrorism."

Are you more optimistic about the Syrian track or the Palestinian track?

"The Palestinian issue is far more complicated. It is not just a territorial conflict. But I think that its long-term strategic importance for Israel's existence is immeasurably more meaningful and dramatic. The Palestinians' military capability is not a threat. But the existential war is not over physical survival but over Israel's existence as a national home and as a democracy. Therefore, peace with Syria is important, but peace with the Palestinians is critical."

On March 20 the director of Military Intelligence informs you that Iran will have a nuclear weapon by the end of the year. What does Prime Minister Livni do?

"I do not have to wait until I am elected and the DMI comes to my office. Israel has acted and continues to act in regard to the Iranian issue. We succeeded in getting the message across. The statement that Iran is a threat is heard these days in Arabic more than in Hebrew. The perception that the world cannot allow a nuclear Iran is also held by the new U.S. administration. But it is necessary to arrive at very deep understandings about the preferred method of action. Sanctions, and toughening them, are meaningful only if it is announced that all options are on the table."

Does that include the military option?

"All the options are on the table."

We are talking about the biggest challenge that an Israeli prime minister has ever faced. Can you handle it?

"I do not want to minimize the threat. The threat exists. But the role of the leadership is to find a response to the threat and not to threaten the citizens. This really is something huge. I do not see it as easy. But if I were not convinced of my ability to cope with the challenge, I would not be running for prime minister."

Let's try the opposite scenario. The polls are right, the Likud wins, Netanyahu becomes prime minister. How great is the danger?

"Israel will lose the chance to advance a process that can preserve it as a Jewish and democratic state. They will say: terrorism first. They will say: the economy first. And it will wobble this way and wobble that way and it won't happen. The significance will be felt in the long term, but the missed opportunity will take place immediately. It's dramatic. It's the difference between hope and the loss of hope."

Would a right-wing government cause a rupture with the United States?

"If Netanyahu becomes prime minister, we will lose our ability to recruit the United States against Iran, Hezbollah and Hamas. Our ability to put together an international coalition against those threats will be affected immediately. Beyond that, we will see behavior of a kind that the public has long since grown fed up with. The type of behavior that made me leave Likud and made the people of Israel leave Likud. But leave it, it won't happen. I intend to win. There is no other scenario."

If Bibi nevertheless wins, will you serve in his government?

"I am not dealing with that possibility. But let no one in Israel console himself. Let no one think that he will vote Bibi and get me as part of the package. It's either me or him."

Would Tzipi Livni serve in the same government with Avigdor Lieberman?

"I will form a government, I will set the basic guidelines, and if Lieberman accepts them - yes."

Despite his extreme positions and his comments about stripping people who will not sign a loyalty oath of their citizenship, you see Lieberman as a partner?

"A government has a path and everyone who joins is committed to that path. By the way, in regard to various issues that relate to Israel's internal matters - to the struggle with Shas and a change of the regime - there is actually room to possibly move ahead together with Lieberman."

You and Lieberman have a common denominator?

"On condition that the diplomatic process is not frozen. I am not ready to subordinate an essential agenda element to coalition needs."

Do you see a possibility of forming a united Kadima-Labor bloc?

"When I form a government I will want to bring Labor in just as I will want to bring Likud in. Will a joint political bloc be created? I can't tell you, I don't know."

Where do you get your faith in victory? The polls do not augur well for you, yet you are displaying rampant self-confidence.

"I made a decision that was not a simple one for me: to offer the public this option named Tzipi Livni. Having made the decision, I know I did the right thing. I believe that this is what has to happen. It is not from God, it is the right thing to happen. And I am going with that. This is what I have to do and this is what I am doing. I believe in this 100 percent. I have confidence that this is what is right for the country."

Is there anything distinctive about being a female leader?

"Yes, I think women and men behave differently. We are less ego-struck. Our dialogue is deeper and less outward. I reached the conclusion that we are also more businesslike. Maybe because we are also mothers. We do not allow ourselves to waste working time, because we have pangs of conscience, we left the children at home. Of course, it is wrong to generalize. There are different women and there are different men who are connected to the feminine side. But I discovered the difference late. There really is a difference."

The war in Gaza hurt you; you are its political victim. After all and despite everything, the war benefited the boys and hurt the girl.

"I do not feel like a victim. Never. I am not the victim type. But I am paying a political price, which I knew I would pay. There is a problem of chauvinism. There is a perception that security matters are not for women. That is a mistaken conception. I do not feel in the least inferior when I enter the decision-making room. I bear a very weighty responsibility. I am aware that every decision can send a soldier to his death. But my ability to make correct decisions quickly is no less than anyone else's. With great modesty, I also think it is greater. But I know that part of the public finds it difficult to internalize the fact that in the decision-making room there were two men and a woman. And the woman was the one who pushed for a military operation. The woman was the one who thought that we should not go for a humanitarian cease-fire after the air offensive. The woman was the one who thought we must not enter into a dialogue with Hamas.

"I am happy that at the end of the operation the people of Israel were happy and the Israel Defense Forces were proud and self-confidence returned. But I know that because of the social stigmas I am paying for all that. Even during the operation I knew I would pay. But I refused to introduce political insights into the decision-making. I do not have that privilege. If I do not make the right decision in time and do not say it in time, I cannot live with myself."